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Changes in neighborhood status result primarily from the selective migration of income groups into and
out of areas. These changes, in turn, are related to the chance of becoming the victim of a crime in a locality.
Drawing on social disorganization theory, this study argues that victimization is more likely in disadvantaged
neighborhoods as well as in neighborhoods where socioeconomic improvements are taking place. Gentrifying
neighborhoods may suffer from social instability caused by the strong influx of new residents and from social
heterogeneity, which is caused by the simultaneous presence of different income groups and, depending on local
context, different ethnic groups. We test these hypotheses with Dutch victimization survey data among approxi-
mately 70,000 respondents, distributed across 2,500 neighborhoods within 500 municipalities in the Nether-
lands. The results show that, controlling for various individual, neighborhood, and city characteristics, intensive
socioeconomic improvement of neighborhoods is related to higher victimization risk for theft, violence, and van-
dalism. In the Netherlands, high levels of residential instability in gentrifying areas are the mediating mecha-
nism responsible for this relationship, while varying levels of ethnic and income heterogeneity are not. The
results confirm that social disorganization is dependent not only upon the socioeconomic composition of neigh-
borhoods, but also upon their socioeconomic dynamics.
 
A central finding in ecological crime studies is that disadvantaged neighborhoods are
confronted with a relatively large amount of crime. Research from the United States (Bellair
1997; Lauritsen 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) as well as other countries (Lee
2000; Sampson and Groves 1989; Wittebrood 2000) has found that the more concentrated
low income groups are within an area, the higher the risk its inhabitants run of becoming the
victim of a crime. According to social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942), the
small amount of material and political resources held by the inhabitants of disadvantaged
neighborhoods leads to a collective inability for internal organization. Indeed, in low status
neighborhoods social contacts between community members are relatively few (Bellair 1997),
participation in local organizations is rare (Sampson and Groves 1989), and trust in other
people is low (Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh 2001). In such a context, collective social control
is hard to realize, which, in turn, increases the attractiveness of the area as a place to com-
mit crimes (Kornhauser 1978; Sampson et al. 1997; Van Wilsem, De Graaf, and Wittebrood
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2003). Furthermore, some scholars have argued that because members of disadvantaged
neighborhoods have few connections with local government officials, they lack the ability to
secure the external resources necessary for local crime control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993;
Vélez 2001). Logically, it would therefore appear that efforts to reduce crime in disadvan-
taged neighborhoods should aim at increasing local socioeconomic status, for example, by
renovation and renewal of the housing stock, which might lead to the inflow of more affluent
inhabitants.
However, social disorganization theory predicts community cohesion to be low not only in
disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also in areas characterized by strong social heterogeneity
and instability (Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay 1942). Social ties between
community members decline with increasing social difference and decreasing average length
of residency, which are due to strong migration flows into and out of a neighborhood. Schol-
ars assume that this lack of social ties and resulting low levels of collective efficacy are among
the prime determinants of local crime (Sampson et al. 1997). Since the socioeconomic upgrad-
ing of neighborhoods is often accompanied by increased social heterogeneity and instability
(Atkinson 2000; Covington and Taylor 1989; Van Kempen and Van Weesep 1994), such pro-
cesses of change may stimulate crime rather than decrease it. Also, urban geographers have
pointed out the potential for conflict between old residents and new settlers in gentrifying
neighborhoods (Atkinson 2000; Betancur 2002; Smith 1996). This also increases neighbor-
hood disorganization, and ultimately, local crime.
Few studies have systematically addressed the relationship between gentrification and
local crime victimization, yet it seems that crime is indeed more prominent in improving
neighborhoods, compared to stable ones (Covington and Taylor 1989; Taylor and Covington
1988). Furthermore, the socioeconomic decline of neighborhoods is also associated with high
local crime rates; because the concentration of low income groups stimulates social disorgani-
zation (Bursik and Webb 1982; Skogan 1990). This study evaluates how socioeconomic
change relates to the risk of theft, violence, and vandalism in the neighborhood. Unlike pre-
vious studies on this topic, which were restricted to one city (e.g., Bursik and Webb 1982;
Covington and Taylor 1989), the analyses in this study were performed on a countrywide
scale for the Netherlands, including more than 2,500 neighborhoods for the period from
1994 to 1998.
Since gentrification of Dutch neighborhoods was more common in urban than in rural
areas during this period, statistical controls were included for crime-inducing influences present
in the wider spatial context (i.e., the city). The city context may determine victimization risk
because the allocation of government resources for crime reduction differs across cities (Bur-
sik and Grasmick 1993; Maume and Lee 2003; Skogan 1990). Also, the physical proximity of
crime-inducing circumstances in nearby neighborhoods increases risk due to offender mobil-
ity and, possibly, because behavior that is prominent in surrounding neighborhoods is imi-
tated by community members (Cohen and Tita 1999; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush
2001). By considering structural factors external to neighborhoods, this study expands on
previous studies in which crime-inducing conditions in the wider context were taken into
account (Heitgerd and Bursik 1987; Morenoff et al. 2001; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000).
 
Theoretical Background
 
Neighborhoods are confronted with a certain amount of social change over time, due to
households settling in and moving out. Selectivity in these migration patterns is an important
source of socioeconomic neighborhood change (Quillian 1999). To simplify, improving neigh-
borhoods have high income household inflow, low income household outflow, or both, while
these patterns are reversed in deteriorating neighborhoods. Developments in the extra-local
housing market are the main driving force behind these movements (Organisation for Economic
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Co-operation and Development 1998). In areas where old housing stock is renovated and
rental homes are replaced by owner-occupied dwellings, the supply of housing for higher
income groups increases. Thus, gentrifying neighborhoods often experience a strong inflow
of affluent households (Atkinson 2000; Butler and Robson 2001; Taylor and Covington 1988).
Conversely, socioeconomic decline prevails in neighborhoods where investments in mainte-
nance and improvement of the local housing stock are low. These areas have low competi-
tiveness on the housing market because the local real estate offers little space and luxury
(Skogan 1986). In such neighborhoods, the 
 
outflow
 
 of residents is selective, with affluent resi-
dents usually moving out first in search of better housing (South and Crowder 1997). Simul-
taneously, there are few incoming residents, and the new residents who do come are often
disadvantaged households whose low incomes match the local housing prices, such as young
people, ethnic minorities, and single parent households (Quillian 1999; Skogan 1986; Wilson
1987). Residents of deteriorating neighborhoods run a high risk of victimization due to the
concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage around them and the low levels of social con-
trol that results from this (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 1997).
Traditionally, the social disorganization of neighborhoods has been assumed to be most
likely to occur in disadvantaged and deteriorating areas (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay
1942; Skogan 1990). However, the consequences of neighborhood gentrification for risks of
local victimization may not be unambiguously positive. On the one hand, improving neigh-
borhoods become less disadvantaged due to the inflow of high income households. The
accompanying increase in collective resources boosts the community’s potential for internal
organization and therefore decreases the risk of victimization (Butler and Robson 2001;
McDonald 1986). On the other hand, the strong inflow of new affluent residents hampers
the realization of social cohesion, because many neighbors are not acquainted yet or else
have only known each other for a short time. Furthermore, social distance between residents
is often more pronounced in gentrifying neighborhoods due to income differences between
old and new residents (Atkinson 2000; Covington and Taylor 1989; DeGiovanni and Paulson
1984). Such heterogeneity generally undermines the formation of social contacts between
residents and, consequentially, decreases the collective ability to achieve common goals, such
as local safety (Sampson et al. 1997).
Levels of 
 
ethnic
 
 heterogeneity may also change with gentrification processes at work.
However, as the opportunities for local heterogeneity depend on racial group sizes in the
larger community, ethnic differences within neighborhoods may either increase or decrease
through gentrification. In the United States, low income urban neighborhoods are predomi-
nantly non-white (Krivo and Peterson 2000; Quillian 1999), while high income settlers in
gentrifying areas are mostly white (Lees 2000; Smith 1996).
 
1
 
 Thus, ethnic heterogeneity may
increase with gentrification. In other contexts, however, such as the Netherlands and many
other West European countries, ethnic minorities have smaller group sizes. Consequently,
relatively few neighborhoods are composed of non-white majority populations.
 
2
 
 Although
many non-white Dutch neighborhoods are relatively poor, the many disadvantaged areas are
predominantly white. Under such circumstances, the migration of (mainly white) high
income groups into gentrifying neighborhoods leads to decreases in ethnic heterogeneity.
Urban geographers have further argued that socioeconomic improvement in neighbor-
hoods may involve conflict between old residents and newcomers, further discouraging the
formation of social bonds between them. In 
 
The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the
Revanchist City
 
, Neil Smith (1996) sees gentrification as a class conflict pitting the affluent
 
1. Nevertheless, Bostic and Martin (2003) show that for some neighborhoods in Chicago, gentrification in the
1970s could be traced back to the inflow of black homeowners. Also see Lees (2000) for a similar example in Brooklyn.
2. In the Netherlands, neighborhoods with nonwhite majority populations are scarce and are found almost solely
in the three largest cities: Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam. In 1998 (the year studied in this research), 28 Dutch
neighborhoods had populations composed of 50 percent or greater non-Western residents (approximately 1 percent of
all neighborhoods with available data). Of these, 25 were located in the three cities mentioned.
 Neighborhood Dynamics and Crime Victimization
 
229
 
against minority and low income households, and he sees the motivation for the competition
as the struggle for ownership of the inner city space. Old residents hold new, affluent residents
responsible for “buying out” the previous residents, people with whom older neighborhood
members maintained social contact (Atkinson 2000; McDonald 1986). Indeed, Smith (1996),
Jason Hackworth (2002), and John J. Betancur (2002) found that the gentrification of neigh-
borhoods in New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia met with aggressive resistance from both
displaced and remaining neighborhood members. In London, Rowland Atkinson (2000)
found that longtime residents of gentrifying neighborhoods reacted to the inflow of affluent
newcomers with coordinated campaigns to “mug a yuppie.” Another reason for discontent
among long term residents is that the attractiveness of the neighborhood decreases for them
when local establishments cater to the material preferences of new residents (Atkinson
2000). Income inequality between community members may not only result in social disor-
ganization but may also stimulate feelings of relative deprivation among the less affluent
(Blau and Blau 1982; Taylor and Covington 1988). This induces tendencies toward criminal
offending, although this behavior may be exercised elsewhere.
In sum, although gentrifying neighborhoods are not among the most disadvantaged,
their inhabitants run a higher risk of victimization because the process of socioeconomic
improvement brings with it social instability, heterogeneity and the potential for conflict. By
arguing that positive socioeconomic neighborhood change is also accompanied by social dis-
organization, this study offers an explanation for variations in crime between seemingly well-
off neighborhoods.
 
The Micro and Macro-Level Contexts of Crime Victimization
 
Social disorganization theory anticipates a positive relationship between neighborhood
improvement and crime, but little attention has been devoted to testing this assumption em-
pirically. As a consequence, little is also known about the duration of the improvement effect
on local victimization, or whether safety problems are more severe during certain stages of
the socioeconomic changing process. Ethnographic research on gentrification has pointed out
the unintended side effect of increased crime (e.g., Atkinson 2000). Ralph B. Taylor and Jeanette
Covington systematically examined crime problems of gentrified neighborhoods in Baltimore
between 1970 and 1980 (Covington and Taylor 1989; Taylor and Covington 1988). Robert J.
Bursik and Jim Webb (1982) addressed the relationship between socioeconomic community
changes and shifts in delinquency over various 10-year periods among Chicago neighborhoods.
However, while these studies offer interesting insights into the connection between socio-
economic dynamics and neighborhood crime, there are two notable limitations. First, their
focuses on individual cities raise the question of the extent to which their results can be gen-
eralized. Second, the research by Bursik and Webb (1982) treats social disorganization as
a motivational source of offending, with neighborhood structure affecting the offending
frequency of its residents. As a consequence, it does not offer information about where of-
fenders 
 
commit
 
 their crimes, only about where they 
 
live
 
. Therefore, we cannot ascertain whether
community changes lead to more crimes 
 
within
 
 these neighborhoods—or elsewhere.
This study expands on earlier work by analyzing the crime inducing impact of neighbor-
hood dynamics on a countrywide scale in the Netherlands. Following recent criminological
neighborhood research (Bellair 1997; Lee 2000; Sampson et al. 1997), we use an opportunity-
oriented approach to explain the connection between social disorganization and the victim-
ization of residents within their neighborhoods. This approach considers neighborhood cohe-
sion to be a macrolevel appearance of guardianship, one of the main elements of criminal
opportunity (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Lee 2000; Van Wilsem et al. 2003). As such, social
disorganization reflects the lack of social control by community members, which reduces the
chance that offenders will be caught. Consequently, the amount of disorganization deter-
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mines the extent to which neighborhoods are probable places for crime targets to be victimized.
This approach tightly links social disorganization theory to the routine activities (lifestyle)
model of victimization (Cohen and Felson 1979; Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo 1978).
According to this reasoning, the individual’s risk of victimization is partly determined by local
neighborhood conditions, such as the amount of collective social control that is exercised (see
also Sampson et al. 1997; Veléz 2001).
Following additional insights from routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), we
acknowledge that the suitability of crime targets to offenders is not only shaped by neighbor-
hood disorganization, but by individual target characteristics as well. In this respect, the
opportunity model of victimization emphasizes the importance of targets’ lifestyle traits that
determine their personal guardianship (e.g., by individual crime prevention activities), and
their exposure and attractiveness to offenders (Miethe, Stafford, and Long 1987; Mustaine
and Tewksbury 1998). In our empirical analyses, we account for these notions in order to
rule out the possibility that measurable neighborhood effects will be a result of ignoring com-
positional heterogeneity between ecological units.
Furthermore, we take into account that during the period between 1994 and 1998—this
study’s period of interest—neighborhood improvement in the Netherlands was most promi-
nent in large cities. A sizable increase in the share of owner-occupied properties and a general
improvement in housing quality in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, the four
largest Dutch cities, led to an increased inflow of affluent residents to these cities (Van der
Wouden and De Bruijne 2001). In contrast, socioeconomic decline occurred most frequently
in rural neighborhoods. Because neighborhood improvement has taken place mainly in the
large cities, omitting city size from a model predicting victimization would probably lead to an
overestimation of the effect of neighborhood improvement on crime. Central to this argu-
ment is the assumption that city context is relevant for predicting victimization, while it is
simultaneously and systematically related to neighborhood improvement. Therefore, this
study argues that it is vital to include city traits in the explanatory model of victimization.
City context is related to crime for two main reasons. First, large cities have high crime
rates not only because they contain a disproportionately large number of disorganized neigh-
borhoods, but also because the spatial proximity of that disorganization has an independent,
added effect on crime. A possible reason for this is that offenders operating in certain places
may, through their daily activities, routinely move about in areas nearby (Brantingham and
Brantingham 1984; Smith et al. 2000). Also, community members might imitate dominant
patterns of behavior from surrounding neighborhoods (Cohen and Tita 1999; Sampson,
Morenoff, and Earls 1999). Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen W. Rauden-
bush (2001) offered support for these assumptions with their findings that, independent of
the internal social structure, neighborhood levels of crime are higher the more that nearby
neighborhoods suffer from crime (see also Smith et al. 2000). Second, apart from spatial
dependency effects, hierarchical policy measures are another potential source of contextual
influence that goes beyond neighborhood effects on crime. Following Robert J. Bursik and
Harold Grasmick (1993), there are differences in the extent to which people can apply for
external resources beneficial to the maintenance of local public safety. María B. Vélez (2001)
found lower victimization risk in areas with high levels of public social control (i.e., many
contacts between neighborhood inhabitants and local police or government officials). In this
study, city-level public social control is included as an indicator of access to external resources,
which is expected to reduce the chance of residents becoming the victim of a crime.
 
Data and Methods
 
To test the hypotheses, we combined victimization survey data with census data regard-
ing the structural characteristics of neighborhoods (four-digit zip codes) and cities. The data
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for victimization and individual target characteristics were drawn from the Dutch Police Pop-
ulation Monitor (PPM; Dutch Ministry of Justice 1999). The PPM survey was conducted under
the authority of the Dutch ministries of justice and domestic affairs. Within each of the Nether-
lands’ 25 police regions, at least 1,000 interviews were collected, and in most regions sub-
stantially higher numbers were gathered. The overall sample consisted of 77,539 respondents
age 15 years or older.
 
3
 
 Complete data were available for 69,819 respondents from 2,526
neighborhoods in 527 municipalities, covering some 65 percent of all Dutch neighborhoods
and 98 percent of Dutch municipalities.
 
Dependent Variables
 
Respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of a crime during the past 12
months. Five different types of victimization were distinguished: burglary, car-related theft,
violence, car vandalism, and other vandalism. For each of these, we constructed dichotomous
variables to indicate whether the respondent had experienced this crime (1) or not (0).
Respondents who reported a car theft or theft from a car were considered victims of car-
related theft. Respondents reporting threats, assault, or violent robbery were considered vic-
tims of violence. Because this part of the study focuses on the impact of local social conditions
on victimization, incidents were selected that occurred within the respondent’s neighborhood
of residence.
 
4
 
 Of all victims of car-related theft, 59 percent reported at least one incident in
their own neighborhood. For victims of violence, this amounted to 46 percent, while of all
victims of car vandalism, 72 percent reported at least one neighborhood incident. For other
vandalism, 82 percent of all victims experienced an incident in their own neighborhood.
 
Independent Variables
 
To control for compositional differences between neighborhoods, several individual tar-
get characteristics were included in the analyses. If these individual characteristics were
related to victimization, and were differentially distributed across neighborhoods, they would
offer an alternative explanation for neighborhood-level crime differences. Thus, by control-
ling for compositional differences, we were better able to test hypotheses about the link
between social context and victimization (Sampson et al. 1997). Many studies (e.g., Hindel-
ang et al. 1978) have found 
 
gender, age, marital status
 
, and 
 
ethnicity 
 
to be correlates of victimiza-
tion. These were thus introduced as control variables in the analyses. The measure for marital
status shows whether the respondent was single (1) or married/cohabiting (0). Ethnic status
was measured as a dichotomy, with respondents reporting to be Surinam, Turkish, Moroccan
or Antillean receiving a score of 1, and all others 0.
 
5
 
 Respondents’ 
 
educational level
 
 indicates
their attractiveness as a crime target because it is an indicator of socioeconomic status and,
therefore, presumed possession of luxury goods. This variable has seven categories, ranging
from “primary education” (1) to “university” (7).
Two variables reflect the respondent’s housing conditions and provided additional mea-
sures of target attractiveness, with respect to theft. First, a distinction was made between
 
home owners
 
 (1) and 
 
renters
 
 (0). Second, respondents were categorized as 
 
living in a detached
house
 
 (1) or not (0). Furthermore, two lifestyle indicators measured the exposure to potential
offenders and the level of personal guardianship over domestic property (Miethe et al. 1987).
First, the respondent’s main occupation was dichotomized into “
 
working for a paid job
 
” (1) ver-
sus “
 
otherwise
 
” (0). Second, respondents indicated the 
 
average number of hours their home was
 
3. Prior publications based on PPM data are scarce, but see Wittebrood and Junger (2002) and Tseloni et al.
(2004).
4. No further instructions were given to respondents to define their neighborhood area.
5. A small number of other ethnic categories could not be disaggregated. These include both Western and non-
Western foreigners and are coded as 0 (not an ethnic minority).
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left unoccupied
 
 by one of six categories, ranging from “0 to 1 hour” (1) to “more than 40
hours” (6).
 
6
 
 Finally, for car-related crimes, 
 
the number of cars owned by the household
 
 was
included as an indicator of the opportunity for car-related victimization the target presented.
At the neighborhood level, information was taken from Dutch census data (
 
Main Indica-
tors Four Digit Zip Codes 1999
 
) published by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS),
unless stated otherwise. First, a summary index of 
 
socioeconomic neighborhood disadvantage
 
 was
computed, based on the results of a factor analysis including mean income per income recip-
ient, percentage of income recipients with a low income (below the 40 percent line of the
national income distribution) and percentage of income recipients between 15 and 64 years
of age living on public benefit. In the index on socioeconomic disadvantage, these indicators
were weighted by their factor loadings (
 

 
0.85, 0.95, and 0.81, respectively). 
 
Residential mobil-
ity
 
 was calculated as the ratio of residential moves into the neighborhood (inflow) to the total
number of neighborhood inhabitants. This indicator was based on data from the Dutch postal
services. For the area code available in the PPM data (four digit zip codes), measures on 
 
ethnic
composition
 
 for Dutch neighborhoods are available only for the percentage of non-Western
ethnic minorities.
 
7
 
 This is not equivalent to the traditional disorganization indicator of ethnic
heterogeneity, which requires information on the relative size of each ethnic category. Still,
our measure is likely to correlate highly with it, considering the relatively small percentage of
ethnic minorities in many Dutch neighborhoods, which we noted earlier. Data availability
restrictions also constrain the calculation of 
 
income heterogeneity
 
 to a rather rough measure.
From two income groups (income recipients above the 80 percent line of the national income
distribution and income recipients below the 40 percent line of the national distribution) the
lowest prevalence rate was taken. Thus, the greater the relative size of the smallest income
group, the more high and low income groups coexist within the same neighborhood. Finally,
the 
 
percentage of youngsters age 15 to 24
 
 was included to control for the proximity of potential
offenders.
We used residual change scores to determine socioeconomic neighborhood dynamics
between 1994 and 1998. These scores equal the residual of a regression analysis in which the
initial levels of an indicator are used to predict levels at a later point in time (Bohrnstedt
1969).
 
8
 
 Thus, they give an indication of changes within the dynamics of the social system as a
whole (in this case: the Netherlands). If an increase of a certain feature occurs in all neigh-
borhoods, then this increase is “predicted” Therefore, residual change scores that diverge
from zero imply deviations from the general pattern of change, and as such, they measure
the direction of socioeconomic status 
 
redistribution
 
 within a neighborhood between two
points in time. In this case, income levels in Dutch neighborhoods increased moderately, with
a 10 percent change between 1994 and 1998. Thus, our residual change scores indicate how
the development of neighborhood status differs from this general process of modest apprecia-
tion. Although residual change scores are often highly correlated to relative change scores
(
 
r
 
 
 

 
 0.90), they have the advantage of being independent of the feature’s initial level. It should
be emphasized that for the current analyses, this is important because regression estimates of
neighborhood change on victimization may otherwise mask effects of a neighborhood’s posi-
tion of origin.
 
9
 
6. No valid score on this variable was available for 2,983 respondents. They were therefore assigned a missing
value. A dummy variable indicating whether respondents had a missing value for this question enabled us to determine
whether this group differed from the assigned mean value in its relation to victimization.
7. These are people who have at least one parent born in a non-Western, developing country. This includes Tur-
key and countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, except for Japan and Indonesia (with this last country, the Nether-
lands had colonial relations in the past).
8. Previous crime studies that have used residual change scores are Bursik and Webb (1982), Covington and Tay-
lor (1989), Schuerman and Kobrin (1986), and Taylor and Covington (1988).
9. The results of our regression models that include neighborhood status position of destination (1998) and resid-
ual neighborhood status change (between 1994 and 1998) were validated by additional analyses in which the first term
was replaced by the mean status position of origin and destination. This way, we ascertained whether the effect of
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A summary index of 
 
socioeconomic neighborhood change
 
 was computed based on residual
change scores on mean income per income recipient, the percentage of low income residents
(with an income less than 40 percent of the national average), and the percentage of residents
between 15 and 64 years of age living on public benefit. Again, each indicator in this index
was weighted in proportion to its factor loadings (
 

 
0.83, 0.89, and 0.54, respectively). High
values on this index indicate neighborhood decline, while low values point toward neighbor-
hood improvement. Neighborhoods were categorized into five groups according to their
value on the socioeconomic change index. If this value was at least two standard deviations
higher than the mean, neighborhoods were considered to be experiencing strong decline.
Neighborhoods with values at least two standard deviations lower than the mean were pre-
sumed to be experiencing strong improvement. If the change index value was between one
and two standard deviations higher or lower than the mean, neighborhoods were categorized
as undergoing moderate decline or experiencing moderate improvement, respectively. Neigh-
borhoods that differed less than one standard deviation from the mean on the socioeconomic
change index were considered to be stable.
 
10
 
We controlled for three variables at the city level. First, the 
 
total number of inhabitants
 
 was
included in the explanatory model. Values for this variable were subjected to natural log
transformation to induce normal distribution. Second, because competing hypotheses can be
formulated with regard to the city’s 
 
mean income
 
 (per income recipient), it was introduced as a
control variable. On the one hand, high levels of affluence may be an indication to offenders
that the city accommodates many attractive targets, while on the other hand, it may offer
local authorities a larger pool of resources to spend on law enforcement (Reiss 1986). Third,
the 
 
public social control
 
 variable was represented by city-level performance of local police offi-
cials. This indicator was measured by subjecting respondent survey answers on this matter to
ecometric analyses (Raudenbush and Sampson 1999). Four items in the PPM survey pro-
vided information for this purpose: (1) “the police [offer] protection around here,” (2) “the
police [react] to local problems,” (3) “the police [try] hard in this neighborhood,” and (4)
“the police [handle] matters efficiently in this neighborhood” (1 
 

 
 disagree, 2 
 

 
 do not agree
or disagree, 3 
 

 
 agree). These questions offer insight into the availability of external
resources for the benefit of neighborhood safety (see also Vélez 2001). By taking into account
individual differences in propensity to agree with these items (see Appendix), the ecometric
measure adjusts for compositional differences between ecological units, and therefore has
improved comparative quality. Furthermore, unlike objective indicators of police perfor-
mance, such as clearance rates, reporting rates and number of personnel, our ecometric mea-
sure does not suffer from serious registration inconsistencies or selectivity between areas
(Baumer 2002; Novak et al. 2002; Warner 1997). As such, the inclusion of this measure fits
in a recent tradition of sociological research that explores the possibilities to measure ecologi-
cal constructs by survey answers of respondents, partly as a response to comparative prob-
lems associated with official ecological data (Kelly and Swindell 2002; Raudenbush and
Sampson 1999; Reisig and Correia 1997).
The internal consistency of an ecometric measure not only depends upon the correlation
between the items, the number of items, and the difficulty of the items (as is the case with an
individual-level scale), but also upon the rater’s agreement and the sample size within the
 
neighborhood change on victimization is dependent on the inclusion of neighborhood status position of origin. These
additional analyses show that this is not the case for all types of victimization considered. The results are available upon
request from the first author.
10. Only the neighborhoods characterized by strong negative residual change experienced mean income declines
 
in absolute terms
 
. Neighborhoods experiencing income increases well below the average increase of 10 percent were
characterized as moderately declining, in terms of residual change. Income increases in neighborhoods experiencing
moderate and strong positive residual change were well above average increases, with 16 percent and 22 percent,
respectively.
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ecological setting of interest (in this case, the city). The reliability of an ecometric scale is
defined as 
 

 
(
 

 
00
 
/[
 

 
00
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
/
 
N
 
j
 
])
 
/J,
 
 with 
 

 
00
 
 being the variance between cities, 
 

 
2
 
 the variance
between individuals within the city, 
 
N 
 
the sample size in the city, and 
 
J 
 
the total number of
cities (Sampson et al. 1999). The present measure for public social control has a reliability
coefficient of 0.83. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the intraclass correlation equals
0.033 (0.016/[0.016 
 

 
 0.471]), which means that almost 97 percent of the scale variance is
between individuals within cities.
 
11
 
 The appendix elucidates the construction of the ecometric
measure for city-level public social control.
Table 1 offers a description of the variables used in this study.
 
Table 1 •
 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
 
Individual characteristics (
 
n 
 

 
 69,937)
Victim burglary 0.06 0.26 0 1
Victim car-related theft in neighborhood 0.04 0.24 0 1
Victim violence in neighborhood 0.02 0.15 0 1
Victim car vandalism in neighborhood 0.13 0.33 0 1
Victim other vandalism in neighborhood 0.07 0.25 0 1
Male 0.44 0.50 0 1
Age 45.12 16.71 15 98
Single 0.20 0.40 0 1
Ethnic minority 0.01 0.10 0 1
Educational level 4.08 1.75 1 7
Working for a paid job 0.58 0.49 0 1
Frequency nobody home 3.85 1.51 1 6
Missing value frequency nobody home 0.04 0.20 0 1
Home owner 0.64 0.48 0 1
Detached house 0.16 0.36 0 1
Number of cars 1.14 0.72 0 7
Neighborhood characteristics (
 
n 
 

 
 2,526)
Socioeconomic change, 1994–1998
Strong decline 0.02 0.12 0 1
Moderate decline 0.10 0.31 0 1
Stability 0.76 0.43 0 1
Moderate improvement 0.08 0.28 0 1
Strong improvement 0.03 0.18 0 1
Socioeconomic disadvantage 1998
 

 
0.03 0.97
 

 
6.36 3.40
Percentage ethnic minorities 6.48 9.26 0 82
Percentage youngsters aged 15–24 11.79 2.86 5 40
Income heterogeneity 20.14 6.30 5 38
Residential mobility 3.98 2.27 0.82 50.9
City characteristics (
 
n 
 

 
 527)
Total number of inhabitants (natural log) 9.83 0.86 6.91 13.50
Mean income (in 1,000 Dutch guilders) 32.86 2.76 27.8 47.2
Public social control 0.00 0.08
 

 
0.34 0.45
 
Source: Data from Dutch Police Population Monitor 1999 (Dutch Ministry of Justice 1999) and Dutch census data
(Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 1995, 1999).
11. However, Duncan and Raudenbush (1999) demonstrated that small contextual variance in individual-level
measures does not rule out large contextual effects.
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Analytic Strategy
 
When using nested data (individuals within neighborhoods within cities) to test the
hypotheses, it is important to take into account that measurement errors at the different
levels are correlated. We, therefore, employed multilevel models, which estimate separate
error terms at each analytical level (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Because the dependent vari-
ables are dichotomous (victim/not victim), logistic models are appropriate here. In hierarchi-
cal logistic models, the distribution of measurement errors at the individual level is presumed
to be binomial. This parameter, therefore, has a fixed value of 1. Additional analyses (not
shown) indicated that this is a valid assumption for the current models. The errors at the
neighborhood and city levels were presumed to follow a normal distribution (Snijders and
Bosker 1999). In addition, the potential for multicollinearity was explored by examining vari-
ance inflation factor (VIF) scores and condition indices. Low values for VIF scores (below 4)
and condition indices (below 9) in these analyses indicate that multicollinearity did not seri-
ously affect parameter estimates (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980).
 
Results
 
Figure 1 and Table 2 describe several features of Dutch neighborhoods, distinguished by
the kind of socioeconomic change they underwent between 1994 and 1998. Figure 1 displays
two types of socioeconomic change for different types of neighborhoods: absolute change in
the percentage of residents with a low income and a similar measure for high income resi-
dents. Again, low income refers to those under the 40 percent line of the national income dis-
tribution, while high income refers to those above the 80 percent line.
 
12
 
 These data do not
refer to inflow or outflow of specific income groups, but rather to changes in their relative
size within neighborhoods. In many of the neighborhoods that underwent strong improve-
ments, the percentage of low income recipients decreased considerably, while the percentage
high income recipients increased. However, there were several exceptions to this pattern.
Also, among the other types of neighborhoods, there is differentiation in the specific socio-
economic changes they underwent.
From Table 2, several other differences are evident between improving, stable, and
declining neighborhoods. First, residential mobility, in terms of inflow of new residents, is
substantially higher among improving neighborhoods, especially among those that have
undergone drastic change. Thus, these neighborhoods are dealing with high levels of social
instability. With respect to income heterogeneity, lower levels are observed among declining
and stable neighborhoods, compared to improving neighborhoods. The ethnic composition of
an area also varies by type of socioeconomic dynamics. The relative number of non-Western
immigrants is highest in declining neighborhoods. In improving neighborhoods, group sizes
of non-Western ethnic populations are about average for 1998, and hardly different from the
average size in stable neighborhoods. Additional analyses reveal that declining neighbor-
hoods experienced the largest growth in non-Western population between 1994 and 1998
(more than 5 percentage points, with 3 percentage points being the overall growth rate). In
improving neighborhoods however, initial levels of ethnic minorities were low, averaging
approximately 5 percent, and ethnic growth rates from 1994 to 1998 were at the national
average (approximately 3 percentage points).
Finally, socioeconomic dynamics are also unevenly distributed between cities of varying
size. Improving neighborhoods are overrepresented among the largest cities in the Nether-
lands, while declining neighborhoods are most frequently located in small towns.
Table 3 depicts the results of logistic multilevel models for the prediction of victimiza-
tion for burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism, and other vandalism. For each
 
12.  These specific measures are used due to their availability across a large number of Dutch neighborhoods.
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Figure 1 • Change in Percentage Low- and High-Income Recipients among Neighborhoods that 
Have Experienced Substantial Socioeconomic Dynamics
 
crime type, four separate models were estimated. In Model 1, victimization risk is predicted
using individual-level, neighborhood-level, and city-level predictors. Model 2 introduces
neighborhood-level ethnic composition into the equation. In Model 3, we add income het-
erogeneity. Finally, Model 4 introduces residential mobility as an explanatory factor. These
additive models allow us to evaluate changes in the effects of neighborhood change and vic-
timization, in order to determine what the mediating mechanisms are. A short discussion of
individual-level effects is offered first, after which we turn to neighborhood-level and city-
level effects.
At the individual level, many of our findings are consistent with opportunity-oriented
theories of victimization (Hindelang et al. 1978; Miethe et al. 1987). For example, age is con-
sistently related to each of the five types of crime, possibly because the daily routines of
young people bring them into contact with other youngsters, who are overrepresented among
offender populations (Hindelang et al. 1978). Working at a paid job and being part of a
household that is frequently unoccupied increases the likelihood of becoming a victim of bur-
glary, car-related theft, and car vandalism within the neighborhood. This is in line with the
routine activity hypothesis that being away from home decreases people’s ability to guard
over their domestic property and therefore increases victimization risk (Hindelang et al. 1978).
Furthermore, burglaries are committed more often in detached houses, while homeowners
and people in detached houses experience 
 
less
 
 car-related theft and car vandalism than do
renters and residents of other housing types. Although these categories score high on target
attractiveness, the lower risks may be explained by the greater opportunity for indoor car
storage and thus higher levels of guardianship.
At the neighborhood level, it appears that, for 
 
all
 
 five types of crime considered here, the risk
of victimization is higher in places where a process of socioeconomic improvement has taken
place over the past four years (Model 1). This offers consistent support for the association
between gentrification and local crime victimization. Inhabitants of declining neighborhoods
do not run higher risk of victimization, after controlling for higher levels of socioeconomic
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disadvantage. Therefore, neighborhood decline is associated with victimization only insofar
as these neighborhoods have a higher concentration of disadvantaged residents. In turn, con-
centration of socioeconomic disadvantage is consistently associated with a higher risk of theft,
violence, and vandalism. Unexpectedly, residents of neighborhoods experiencing moderate
decline have 
 
lower
 
 risks of victimization of car-related theft and non-car related vandalism.
Furthermore, Model 1 shows that risks of victimization are higher with larger youth populations
in the neighborhood.
Turning to the results of Model 2, we find the measure of ethnic composition to be
related to victimization. Consistent with predictions from social disorganization theory,
neighborhoods with larger shares of non-Western minorities are confronted with higher risks
of victimization, for theft as well as for violence and vandalism. However, the relationship
between socioeconomic change and victimization is not moderated by the inclusion of this
variable. Thus, our finding that improving neighborhoods face higher victimization risk is not
due to higher shares of ethnic minorities.
In Model 3, income heterogeneity was not found to be related to victimization at all,
except for car vandalism. However, this effect was not in the expected direction. Thus, the
introduction of neighborhood-level income heterogeneity hardly results in any substantial
changes in the association between socioeconomic improvement and victimization. This also
refutes the hypothesis that improving neighborhoods are confronted with more crime due to
their higher levels of income heterogeneity.
Model 4 also controls for varying levels of residential mobility. This decreases the rela-
tionship between neighborhood improvement and victimization, turning to non-significance
for both types of vandalism considered. A strong inflow of new residents increases victimiza-
tion risk for all the types of crime examined here. In turn, such residential mobility is higher
in improving neighborhoods compared to stable and declining neighborhoods (see Table 2).
These findings consistently show the mediating role of social instability in the relationship
between socioeconomic neighborhood improvement and local victimization risk.
 
Table 2 •
 
Characteristics of Neighborhoods, Distinguished by Type of Socioeconomic Change, 
1994–1998
 
Socioeconomic Neighborhood Change 1994–1998
 
a
 
Total
Strong
Decline
Moderate
Decline Stability
Moderate
Improvem’t
Strong
Improvem’t
 
F
 
-value
(4, 2521)
 
Total number 2526 38 264 1926 214 84
Residential mobility (mean) 3.98 3.07 3.65 3.75 5.12 7.49 75.9*
Income heterogeneity (mean) 20.1 15.6 16.6 20.2 23.3 23.2 54.5*
Percentage non-western
ethnic minorities (mean) 6.48 8.84 8.32 6.17 6.47 6.71 6.7*
 

 
2
 
 (
 
df  8)
City size, %
Less than 50,000 inhabitants 63.3 89.5 64.0 65.8 48.1 28.6
50,000–200,000 inhabitants 28.5 5.3 27.7 27.6 36.9 40.5 117.9*
Four largest cities 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague, Utrecht) 8.3 5.3 8.3 6.6 15.0 31.0
a Neighborhoods that experienced strong decline or strong improvement deviated at least two standard deviations
from the mean on the residual change index, while neighborhoods undergoing moderate decline or improvement
deviated between one and two standard deviations fro the index mean. The remaining neighborhoods are charac-
terized as stable.
* p 	 .01.
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Table 3 • Unstandardized Coefficients from Multilevel Logistic Regression of Crime Victimization on 
Individual, Neighborhood, and City Characteristics
Burglary Violence
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Intercept 3.15** 3.13** 3.13** 3.12** 4.08** 4.06** 4.06** 4.05**
Individual (n  69,937)
Malea .07* .07* .07* .07* .52** .52** .52** .52**
Age .01** .01** .01** .01** .03** .03** .03** .03**
Singlea .01 .01 .01 .01 .14* .14* .15* .14*
Ethnic minoritya .12 .15 .15 .15 .38 .42 .42 .42
Educational level .06** .06** .06** .06** .06** .06** .06** .06**
Working for paid labor .09* .09* .09* .09* .11 .12 .12 .12
Frequency nobody home .03** .03* .03* .03* .03 .03 .03 .03
Missing value frequency
nobody homea .07** .07** .07** .07** .05 .05 .05 .05
Home owner .06 .03 .03 .03 .50** .50** .50** .50**
Detached house .47** .47** .47** .48** .14 .14 .14 .13
Number of cars owned — — — — — — — —
Neighborhood (n  2,526)
Socioeconomic change 1994–1998
Strong decline .08 .09 .10 .12 .13 .14 .13 .17
Moderate decline .09 .11 .10 .10 .08 .07 .05 .06
Stability (ref.) — — — — — — — —
Moderate improvement .20** .20** .19** .16* .18 .13 .14 .06
Strong improvement .24* .26* .24* .16 .38** .40** .42** .25**
Socioeconomic disadvantage 1998 .13** .09** .07 .07 .18** .14** .19** .21**
Percent youngsters .02** .02** .02** .02** .02* .02 .02 .01
Percent non-Western
ethnic minorities — .01** .01** .01** — .01* .01* .01*
Income heterogeneity — — .01 .00 — — .01 .02
Residential mobility — — — .03** — — — .05**
City (n  527)
Total number of inhabitants
(natural log) .26** .23** .23** .22** .25** .22** .22** .20**
Mean incomea .07** .06** .06** .06** .04** .03 .03 .03
Public social control .46* .49* .50* .50* .06 .03 .03 .02 
Variance components
Between cities .03 .03 .03 .03 .05 .04 .04 .04
Between neighborhoods .11 .10 .10 .10 .08 .07 .07 .06
Binomial error 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
a Two-tailed test.
* p 	 .05  ** p 	 .01 (one-tailed).
At the city level, the findings shown in Table 3 indicate that victimization and city size
are positively related, net of individual and neighborhood characteristics. The single excep-
tion to this is “other vandalism.” These findings suggest that crime and urbanism are associ-
ated, not only because of compositional differences between large cities and small towns, but
that they are also associated because city size has an independent crime inducing effect. Fur-
thermore, the relationship between victimization and city-level mean income is significantly
positive for three crime types (burglary, car-related theft, and car vandalism) and slightly neg-
ative for one crime type (other vandalism). Finally, public social control and victimization risk
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Car-Related Theft Car Vandalism Other Vandalism
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
4.00** 3.97** 3.97** 3.94** 2.12** 2.11** 2.11** 2.08** 2.77** 2.76** 2.76** 2.75**
.04 .04 .04 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 .04 .04 .04
.01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01** .01**
.22** .22** .22** .23** .28** .27** .28** .28** .08 .08 .08 .08
.26 .19 .19 .19 .29** .31** .31** .30** .11 .15 .15 .15
.02* .02 .02 .02 .04** .04** .04** .04** .12** .12** .12** .12**
.20** .19** .19** .19** .13** .12** .12** .12** .01 .01 .01 .01
.04* .05** .05** .04** .04** .04** .04** .04** .03** .03** .03** .03**
.11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .21* .21* .21* .21*
.14** .13** .13** .13** .18** .18** .18** .18** .02 .02 .02 .03
.42** .41** .41** .40** .73** .73** .73** .72** .03 .02 .02 .02
.76** .76** .76** .76** .64** .64** .64** .64** — — — —
.17 .17 .17 .22 .25 .24 .23 .19 .14 .15 .16 .19
.32** .35** .35** .32** .08 .09 .07 .06 .19** .19** .19** .19**
— — — — — — — — — — — —
.26** .27** .27** .17* .16** .16** .15** .09 .02 .02 .02 .03
.56** .58** .57** .35** .16* .16* .12 .03 .19* .20* .20* .09
.14** .06 .04 .06 .10** .08** .01 .03 .04 .01 .00 .02
.04** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03** .03**
— .01** .01** .01* — .00* .00 .00 — .01* .01* .01*
— — .01 .00 — — .01**a .01*a — — .00 .00
— — — .07** — — — .05** — — — .04**
.46** .41** .41** .38** .27** .25** .25** .23** .05* .02 .02 .01
.09** .07** .07** .07** .06** .05** .06** .06** .02 .03* .03* .03*
.87** .91** .92** .93** .23 .24 .26 .25 .05 .08 .08 .08
.11 .10 .10 .11 .06 .06 .06 .06 .03 .03 .03 .03
.14 .13 .12 .10 .08 .08 .08 .07 .06 .06 .06 .05
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
are inversely related to burglary and car-related theft, but unrelated to neighborhood vio-
lence and to both types of vandalism. The analyses, therefore, suggest that the deterrent
effects of social control exercised by police officials are restricted to theft victimization.
To illustrate in more detail how neighborhood-level socioeconomic composition and
dynamics are related to victimization, the predicted risk of victimization was plotted as a
function of these features (Figures 2, 3, and 4). The predicted victimization risks were derived
from the regression results in Table 3 (Model 1) and held constant for values of the other pre-
dictors in the model. The figures show that victimization becomes more likely with higher
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Figure 2 • Predicted Risk of Burglary Victimization, by Level of Neighborhood Disadvantage in 
1998 and Socioeconomic Neighborhood Dynamics between 1994 and 1998
Figure 3 • Predicted Risk of Violent Victimization, by Level Of Neighborhood Disadvantage in 
1998 and Socioeconomic Neighborhood Dynamics between 1994 and 1998
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levels of socioeconomic disadvantage. Also, declining neighborhoods are more likely to suffer
from the concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage than are improving neighborhoods.
However, high risks of victimization are not only found in disadvantaged neighborhoods;
high risks are also found in non-disadvantaged neighborhoods that are undergoing strong
socioeconomic improvement. If, despite this process, socioeconomic disadvantage remains
above average, the chance of victimization is especially high, comparable to stable neighbor-
hoods and to declining, yet more disadvantaged, neighborhoods. For instance, the highest
predicted risks for burglary victimization (more than 5 percent) are found among inhabitants
of improving neighborhoods that still have a moderately disadvantageous socioeconomic posi-
tion, and among inhabitants of severely disadvantaged neighborhoods, which have declined
the past four years, or remained stable. Similar conclusions can be drawn for victimization of
violence (Figure 3) and car vandalism (Figure 4). These results show that victimization is not
only more likely in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but that there are also pronounced crime
differences between affluent neighborhoods, depending on their socioeconomic dynamics.
Conclusions
From this study of Dutch neighborhoods, we can conclude that the chance of becoming
the victim of a crime is higher not only in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also in neigh-
borhoods that are undergoing strong socioeconomic improvement, at least over the four-year
period covered by this study, from 1994 to 1998. The finding regarding the relationship between
disadvantaged areas and victimization is consistent with many previous neighborhood studies on
crime (e.g., Bellair 1997; Krivo and Peterson 2000; Sampson et al. 1997). The finding on improv-
ing neighborhoods sheds new light on the way in which a neighborhood’s socioeconomic
structure affects the risk of local victimization. Improving neighborhoods are not usually among
the most disadvantaged, yet they do attract much crime. This was verified for five different
types of victimization: burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism, and other vandalism.
Figure 4 • Predicted Risk of Car Vandalism, by Level of Neighborhood Disadvantage in 1998 
and Socioeconomic Neighborhood Dynamics between 1994 and 1998
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Our analyses of Dutch neighborhoods suggest that socioeconomic dynamics is a process
that is accompanied by additional social change, which has a crime-inducing potential. An
important cause underlying neighborhood gentrification is a strong inflow of new (affluent)
residents. According to social disorganization theory, such residential instability reduces the
potential for collective social control, because unstable neighborhoods yield few social contacts
between inhabitants. Indeed, our results show that victimization risk is higher in improving
neighborhoods, as compared to socioeconomically stable neighborhoods, and that this rela-
tionship is largely mediated by varying degrees of residential instability. Other indicators of
neighborhood disorganization, income heterogeneity and large shares of non-Western immi-
grants, did not mediate the relationship between socioeconomic improvement and local victim-
ization. Though levels of income heterogeneity were higher in improving neighborhoods—
with low income and high income groups often living in close proximity to each other—this
variable did not affect victimization risk. The ethnic composition of the neighborhood did
affect local victimization risk, with higher risk in areas with larger shares of non-Western
immigrants, but improving and stable neighborhoods did not differ much from each other on
this aspect.
Although these findings hold for the Netherlands, this does not mean that ethnic hetero-
geneity and within-neighborhood income differences should be dismissed for understanding
the relationship between neighborhood improvement and victimization risk in other con-
texts as well. Gentrification of Dutch neighborhoods is certainly not driven solely by market
forces, if one considers that “housing market controls and urban renewal policies have pre-
vented even the most prestigious residential areas from becoming homogeneously high
income districts” (Van Kempen and Van Weesep 1994). Conversely, Smith’s (1996) and Bet-
ancur’s (2002) accounts of gentrification in U.S. cities suggest that government support pri-
vate sector efforts to allocate land for its most profitable use. In housing sectors where market
forces are more pronounced than in the Netherlands, a relationship between gentrification
and high victimization risk is anticipated as well, but possibly even more sharply due to
higher expected levels of conflict between newcomers and remaining residents (Smith 1996),
and higher (temporary) levels of income differences between neighborhood inhabitants, at
least until substantial displacement of low income households has taken place. In addition,
because ethnic heterogeneity is quite low in Dutch improving neighborhoods (and most
other types of neighborhoods as well), it hardly contributed to an explanation of the associa-
tion between gentrification and local victimization. It may, however, be a distinguishing fea-
ture in the context of urban neighborhood change in the United States (Betancur 2002).
In neighborhoods where improvements are taking place, decreases in victimization can
be expected only after stabilization and, possibly, homogenization of the local community. It
should also be noted that if low income groups relocate elsewhere, crime problems may be
displaced rather than solved. On the other hand, if victimization risks in gentrifying areas
remain high, affluent newcomers will probably have lower attachment to place because of
the fear of crime and perceived incivilities (Brown, Brown, and Perkins 2004). Ultimately,
they could choose to move out of the improved neighborhood in response to the high level of
criminal activity (Morenoff and Sampson 1997). The neighborhood would then fall back into
a process of socioeconomic decline, which, in turn, would keep local victimization rates high.
It would therefore be interesting to investigate neighborhood developments over longer peri-
ods of time. This would allow us to examine whether local crime is an influence on the selec-
tivity of migration patterns. Furthermore, on the methodological side, diagonal reference models
(Sobel 1981) may prove to be a useful tool for further assessing the impact of neighborhood
change on crime. In these models, local crime rates in changing neighborhoods are modeled
as a weighted average of the crime rates in stable neighborhoods in the same position as their
status of origin and stable neighborhoods in the same position as their status of destination.
However, with current statistical programs, it is not yet possible to integrate diagonal reference
models in multilevel analyses.
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Another direction for future investigation concerns the inclusion of additional, interme-
diary variables at the neighborhood level. The central assumption in this study was that neigh-
borhoods vary in their capacity to exercise collective social control. Due to a lack of available
data, it was impossible to test this assumption directly. Therefore, structural variables were
used as factors that constrain social interaction between neighborhood residents, according to
social disorganization theory. Several U.S. studies indicate that social contacts between neigh-
borhood members, along with levels of collective efficacy, mediate the effects of these tradi-
tional disorganization indicators on crime (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 1997). Expanding on
this, it would be interesting to explore whether the same holds true for the effects of neigh-
borhood improvement on victimization. In addition, more direct empirical tests are needed to
evaluate the possible link between gentrification and relative deprivation among the remain-
ing low income households, which may stimulate local criminal activity, as suggested by Taylor
and Covington (1988).
Finally, the results clearly show that victimization in one’s own neighborhood is not only
dependent upon individual and neighborhood characteristics, but also upon the city’s social
context. Individuals living in cities with a large number of inhabitants, high mean income,
and low levels of public social control run a higher risk of becoming the victim of a crime, if
the effects of individual and neighborhood characteristics are taken into account. This finding
constitutes an addition to social disorganization theory, which has explained crime by focus-
ing primarily on the internal characteristics of neighborhoods. These city-level effects support
the assumption that social contexts beyond and external to neighborhoods are relevant for
understanding local differences in crime rates. On one hand, the crime-reducing effect of public
social control points toward a hierarchical effect through city policy (Bursik and Grasmick
1993). On the other hand, the effect of city size on victimization may reflect the crime-inducing
potential of spatial proximity to social disorganization (Morenoff et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2000).
More detailed studies on these two types of contextual effects external to neighborhoods pro-
vide intriguing paths for future inquiry.
Appendix
The city-level variance in public social control indicates the differences between cities in
perceived police functioning in an ecometric measure, given item variance within individuals
and individual variance within cities. The item-level model on public social control for indi-
vidual j within city k on item i is
Yijk  
0jk  
p(Xijk)  ijk,
where Xijk is the item on public social control, and 
p is the regression coefficient of the effect
of this item on public social control, which indicates its ‘difficulty’: the lower 
p, the less often
respondents agree with this item. 
0jk is the respondent’s latent score, controlled for the diffi-
culty of the items to which valid answers were given. On the individual level, the model is

0jk  
0k  
q(Xjk)  0jk,
with 
0k being the city-specific score (which is divided into an overall average 00 and a city-
specific residual score k), Xjk are individual characteristics for which the model is controlled
(as will be explained in more detail below), 
q is the regression weight assigned to these indi-
vidual-level covariates, and 0jk is the variance between individuals within city k. By holding
constant for various individual characteristics associated with the perception of public social
control, the city score on public social control (k) is not distorted by compositional differ-
ences between cities.
In the ecometric analysis of city-level public social control, thirteen individual character-
istics are adjusted for: gender, age, marital status (being single or not), belonging to an ethnic
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minority, educational level, working for paid labor, being a home owner, living in a detached
house, and victimization of burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism, or other van-
dalism. By controlling for the effect of victimization on public social control, the reciprocal
effect between these two characteristics is taken into account: Victimization becomes more
likely with low levels of public social control, while simultaneously, victims may perceive
public social control to be lower compared to non-victims. Therefore, conservative estimates
are offered for the effect of public social control on victimization.
Table A presents the results of the ecometric analysis. Respondents agree the least with
the third item (“The police [try] hard in this neighborhood”), while the second item (“The
police [react] to local problems”) leads to most agreements. On the individual level, there are
also differences in the propensity to perceive public social control. Males, older people, and
singles more often report the presence of public social control than do females, youngsters,
and married people, while educational level and home ownership are negatively related to
public social control. Furthermore, victims of crime (especially violence) generally perceive
lower levels of public social control than non-victims.
Table A • Multilevel Regression of Public Social Control on Items and Individual Characteristics
b-coefficient
Intercept 2.016**
Item
The police offer protection around here (ref.)
The police react to local problems .162**
The police try hard in this neighborhood .276**
The police handle matters efficiently in this neighborhood .261**
Individual
Male .055**
Age .004**
Single .005**
Ethnic minority .048
Educational level .021**
Working for paid labor .003
Home owner .020**
Detached house .008
Victim burglary .000
Victim car-related theft .044**
Victim violence .124**
Victim car vandalism .100**
Victim other vandalism .101**
Variance components
Between cities .016
Between individuals .471
Between items .814
* p 	 .05 ** p 	 .01 (two-tailed test).
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